The term “legalization” is now part of the repertoire of social science and law from the CN Tate Vallinder and T. project (1996) in which these authors established common lines of analysis for empirical compared research of the Judiciary Power in different countries. “Legalization of politics” and “politicization of justice” stand as related expressions, which refer to the effects of the expansion of the judiciary in decision-making of contemporary democracies. Judicialize politics, they say, is to use the typical methods of the judgment in resolving disputes and demands in the political arenas in two contexts: the first resulting from the expansion of operations of the courts by the power of judicial review of legislative and executive actions, is based on a constitution of rights and in relations of checks and balances; the second one, more diffuse, would be posed by the introduction or expansion of court staff or judicial proceedings in the business, as in cases of courts and / or administrative judges and the legislature, as in the case of the Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry (MARCIEL, KOERNER, 2002 , p. 114).
However, this process of legalization of politics can be understood only as a reflection of a trend already present in the history of Law, where the interpretive action of the authority responsible for applying the law set by another legislative authority eventually modify it. Thus, another line of argument would understand this process “apenas [como] um novo nome para o velho fenômeno de que as normas imutáveis são modificadas constantemente pelos intérpretes” (Araújo, 2011, p. 19). Assuming that the standard is not limited to the text, the act of merely interpreting it alone does not reveal the must-be; the interpretation is a necessary process to bring out the decision that will be taken, in a reveal that part of the judge’s figure, a human wrapped in a political and social context that, directly or indirectly, permeates his actions.
“O juiz não pode alterar o texto da lei, mas é demasiadamente ingênua a noção de que norma é texto. Nas leis, o que nos obriga não é o significante, mas o significado que damos a ele. É claro que o significado precisa estar bem articulado com o texto, mas não há como determinar o sentido de uma regra sem avaliar adequadamente os seus contextos de elaboração e aplicação. Porém, não é de todo incomum que a interpretação judicial se descole tanto do texto e do contexto em que foi legislado a ponto de muitos colocarem em dúvida o próprio caráter aplicativo da atividade judicial” (ARAÚJO, 2011, p. 16).
According to Dworkin, the moral reading of the law brings political, controversial and uncertain morality at the heart of constitutional law – thus the government that brings these principles in their law should decide that interpretation that shall have the authority. This moral reading also lacks of intrinsic revolutionary character. The author argues that, in everyday life, judges and lawyers understand the Constitution as a supplier of abstract moral requirements whose application depends on moral judgments made in accordance with the case. There is indeed a need for it to the author (Dworkin, 1996, p. 2.3). To Häberle (1997, p. 123), the truth is a cultural value to the Constitutional State.
By applying the law in a doubtful case, the mediation by the authority can change the direction of the norm, redefining its consequences. Such intervention causes changes without accompanying change in social perception of the norm, increasing the capacity of variation of social organization without resorting so the legislature. It is worth mentioning again that these are mutations that tend to be discrete, they are perceived by the public as realization of the law rather than its amendment (Araújo, 2011, p. 24). To Häberle (1997, p. 13), even who is addressed by the law is part of this hermeneutical process, so it is not undemocratic per se. Even interpret and apply it is also not the only actions to the courts. However, it is for them that the judge takes on greater importance in determining the rights and duties of citizens.
“Ao tratar das leis, os intérpretes terminam por determiná-las, redefinindo os seus contornos, sentidos, fontes, consequências: tudo isso integra a atividade hermenêutica. Tal estratégia tornou possível que alterássemos a lei na medida em que buscávamos compreendê-la, o que resultou numa combinação de estabilidade social com a possibilidade de incorporar variações discretas” (ARAÚJO, 2011, pp. 24,25).
The etymological explanation of hermeneutics is also of interest; the radical mediator comes from god Hermes, which provided human understanding of divine messages, conveying and clarifying their contents to mortals. In fact, no one knew what the gods said, but only what Hermes said about what they anticipated. There arises the conception of (inter) mediation – the message the mediation of the gods brings the interpretation of Hermes. The hermeneutical problem it is, simply, how to make sense of things (Nascimento, 2009, p 150). For Streck, it is only in modern times – so within a different philosophical paradigm of this mythological comparison – which we will talk about it in another way and through another look. Hermeneutics discussed today the fruit of modernity, born with the revolution brought about by the birth of the subject (STRECK, 2013, p. 150).
Modern overcoming of positivism, for this author, hermeneutics involves incompatibility with the thesis of varied responses. The possibility of using more than one answer puts this “choice” as the court discretionary, something antithetical to democratic state. From the philosophical hermeneutics and a critical hermeneutics of law, it would be possible to achieve a hermeneutically appropriate response to the Constitution or at least proper Constitution is examining each case. (STRECK, 2013, p. 165)
When the law changes alter the function of interpreters, their instruments and hermeneutical canons of its activity. This change is itself an expression of policy, and is also linked to is recognized as legislative function. She at the same time and in opposition, also an everyday activity of judges, while necessary changes and possible standards for reinterpretation. The judge in that sense, has always been a political actor (Araújo, 2011, pp. 27).
The relationship of validity – authorizing the application of the norm and giving the reasons for it – does not, in accordance to what was said, a logical analysis that the rate with true or false. Streck, interpreting Kelsen, highlights “as normas jurídicas como prescrições, isto é, enquanto comandos, permissões, atribuições de competência, não podem ser verdadeiras nem falsas” because they are valid or invalid. The resulting question of how the logical principles no contradiction conclusive evidence and reasoning rules can be applied to the relationship between standards is also answered “os princípios lógicos podem ser, se não direta, indiretamente aplicados às normas jurídicas, na medida em que podem ser aplicados às proposições jurídicas que descrevem estas normas e que […] podem ser verdadeiras ou falsas”(STRECK, 2013, p. 159).
As the judge’s work, politics, it is politically established by the compositions of interests held within society. Of course, there are political limits to judicial action, which don’t need to translate immediately the legal limits. The Supreme Court, for example, has function to save the Constitution, which does not mean you have complete freedom to assign meanings to the constitutional text. Formal, there are no legal limits to its interpretation of authority, but in the interactions of civil society and the state turn out to be several limitations on the power of this body, as the legitimacy of their work depends on the social perception every decision in a judgment (ARAÚJO 2011, p. 28).
In this same line, when the judiciary interprets laws, other political and social actors are involved in the law of the game. The Legislature may amend the legal meanings produced by editing another law. The legalization of policy gives coherence and ensures the systematic planning, to regulate the compliance of certain decisions with the basic principles of law, redesigned by own interpretation of the judicial authorities; this does not prevent systematic imperatives that may conflict with dominant conceptions of justice (Araújo, 2011, p.41). The similarities and differences of these actors such as public opinion, for example, allow for a counterbalance to reinterpret actions of the judiciary, providing certain corporate to that judicial ability in the political system.
Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf (2007), taking into account this constant attribution of meaning and the role of constitutional hermeneutics, according to Valeria R. Nascimento, defend the interpretation of constitutional legal norms and legal categories as substantive protection of fundamental rights; reinforcing the necessary character of the (inter)mediation mentioned above. Therefore, you need to find principles of interpretation that could put the Constitution in safer and determined position also in some agreement with the thought of Dowkin already mentioned (Nascimento, 2009, p. 150).
Analyzing the interpretation of Albert Camus (2006, p. 141), writing about the myth of Sisyphus, condemned man to drag a hill rock above, and always plummets as soon reaches the top, you know that the minute he turns to your destination, you realize that this fate was created by himself, united by the memory and sealed by his death. This conviction incessantly push the rock up to the top of a mountain, where made to fall by its own weight, have human origin and everything that is human is always in motion. Of comments on the Sisyphean narrative, one can hold two ideas that the author considers key to the right and the constitutional jurisdiction.
“A primeira permite reconhecer que a personagem lutava por seus objetivos, com isso, venceu muitas batalhas durante a vida. Ora, disso retira-se que o homem […] consegue transformar sua própria condição de ser-no-mundo, sendo responsável por seu destino. Para pensar o presente e o futuro é inolvidável estudar o papel do Estado e dos textos legais que regem as relações sociais. Assim, necessita-se de condições seguras para interpretação da legislação para se atingir a justiça na fundamentação/aplicação da norma jurídica. A segunda ideia é de que tudo que é humano sempre está em movimento, por isso a relevância de pesquisas referentes à linguagem e a interpretação. Ora, se a jurisdição constitucional caracteriza-se pela constante aplicação da Constituição como parâmetro nas decisões judiciais, é indispensável que se verifiquem alguns limites de atuação” (NASCIMENTO, 2009, p. 157).
Streck warns that Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysical paradigm and deductivist of nature, both consolidate the argumentative practices of legal operators. To the extent that the process of training of lawyers has been associated with such practices, there is a return or even maintaining the legal objectivism; as in the case of binding precedents, texts with claims to cover all application cases, something also seen in the General Repercussion Institute and the increasing use of menus jurisprudential said – the question for him, it is a paradigmatic problem.
“Os juristas não conseguem alcançar o patamar da viragem linguístico/hermenêutica, no interior da qual a linguagem, de terceira coisa, de mero instrumento e veículo de conceitos, passa a ser condição de possibilidade. Permanecem, desse modo, prisioneiros da relação sujeito-objeto (problema transcendental), refratária à relação sujeito-sujeito (problema hermenêutico). Sua preocupação é de ordem metodológica e não ontológica […]” (STRECK, 2013, p. 163).
The law that emerges of Democratic Rule of Law paradigm must be understood in a context of growing autonomy of law, due to the failures of the lack of control and on the policy. The Constitution would be manifestation of this degree of autonomy of law, which must be understood as its autonomous dimension against other political, economic and moral dimensions. The law based on this paradigm, not to be undermined by the other dimensions mentioned, acquires an autonomy that as a protection against the very dimensions that engender – autonomy becomes their condition of possibility. The Democratic Rule of Law is under constant threat, as both runs risk of losing autonomy because of these external attacks to weaken as predators in their domestic bases, given the arbitrariness of judgments and the consequent decisionism that inexorably appears (STRECK, 2013, pp. 163, 164). This conclusion finally demonstrates that the relations of the judiciary and the legislature against the legalization of politics can lead to differentiated analysis of the game of Law.
HÄBERLE, Peter. Hermenêutica constitucional: A sociedade aberta dos intérpretes da constituição: contribuição para a interpretação pluralista e “procedimental” da constituição. Tradução de Gilmar Ferreira Mendes. Porto Alegre: Sergio Antonio Fabris Editor, 1997.
NASCIMENTO, Valéria R. A FILOSOFIA HERMENÊUTICA PARA UMA JURISDIÇÃO CONSTITUCIONAL DEMOCRÁTICA: FUNDAMENTAÇÃO/APLICAÇÃO DA NORMA JURÍDICA NA CONTEMPORANEIDADE. Revista DireitoGV, São Paulo: 2009. Disponível em: <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rdgv/v5n1/a08v5n1.pdf>. Acesso em 28 de junho de 2015.
STRECK, Lenio Luiz. Jurisdição e ausência de uma teoria da decisão. Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso [online]. 2013, n.41, pp. 577-601. Disponível em: <http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-68512013000200017&lng=es&nrm=iso>. Acesso em 28 de junho de 2015.
MACIEL, Débora A, KOERNER, Andrei. Sentidos da judicialização política: duas análises. Lua Nova, n.o 57: 2002. Disponível em: <http://www.scielo.br/pdf//ln/n57/a06n57.pdf>. Acesso em 28 de junho de 2015.
DWORKIN, Ronald. Freedom’s Law: the moral reading of the american constitution. Oxford University Press Inc.: New York, USA, 1996. Disponível em: <https://books.google.com.br/books?hl=pt-BR&lr=&id=yeUg-wglsK0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=freedom%27s+law+dworkin&ots=ZWZP54NSVv&sig=GNgUMTS_UEdRPq1hZCRC3bI8FfM#v=onepage&q=freedom%27s%20law%20dworkin&f=false>. Acesso em 28 de junho de 2015.
ARAÚJO, Alexandre C. Judiciário e interpretação: entre Direito e Política. Pensar, Fortaleza, v. 18, n. 1, p. 9-46, jan./abr. 2013.